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Abstract
This Article examines the main legal questions raised by the particulat form of State aid known
as equity participation. While the focus is on the internal, or EEC, aspect of such aids, the Article
also suggests a comparison to some of the most relevant external, or GATT, aspects of these
questions.

GOVERNMENT EQUITY PARTICIPATION
UNDER THE EEC RULES ON STATE
AIDS: RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
Aurelio Pappalardo*
INTRODUCTION
The Commission of the European Communities ("the
Commission") has recently handed down a number of decisions concerning equity participation by EEC Member States
in business enterprises facing financial difficulties. The Court
of Justice of the European Communities ("the Court") has
subsequently clarified some of the most controversial issues in
appeals of some of these decisions.
State intervention in the economy is a characteristic feature of the economic policy of most European countries. To
be sure, the creation of totally State-owned undertakings, as
well as the association of State and private capital within the
same business, often serve the purpose of supporting important but risky industrial initiatives, or of encouraging investments in less developed regions. Such intervention can, however, have other, less desirable effects as well. It may delay the
elimination of noncompetitive structures and may strengthen
existing rigidities. In recent years, under the pressure of economic recession, Member States have often intervened to support ailing companies. The Commission has thus been faced
with the difficult task of deciding whether State measures that
are, in principle, incompatible with the EEC provisions on
State aids, should nevertheless be permitted because they constitute the best means of remedying serious underemployment, or because they enable a company to recover its competitiveness. Furthermore, similar problems have also arisen
within the framework of the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade ("GATT"), especially in the trade relations between the
EEC and its major commercial partner, the United States.
This Article examines the main legal questions raised by
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the particular form of State aid known as equity participation.
While the focus is on the internal, or EEC, aspect of such aids,
the Article also suggests a comparison to some of the most relevant external, or GATT, aspects of these questions.
I. STATE AIDS UNDER THE RULES OF
THE EEC TREATY
A.

General Principles

The Treaty of Rome, which brought the European Economic Community into existence, subscribes to the principles
of a market economy, in that it basically relies on the mechanism of a free market for the achievement of Community goals.
Article 2 of the Treaty describes these goals and indicates that
they should be pursued, first, "by establishing a common market," and second, by progressively approximating the economic policies of Member States.' The creation of a common
market requires the removal of all economic barriers dividing
Member States and the establishment of the fundamental
"four freedoms": free movement of goods, persons, services,
and capital. 2 The single-market goal, envisioned from the outset by the Treaty, has recently been confirmed and made the
top priority of the Community.3 The primacy of the common
market is confirmed by a comparison of the provisions of the
1. Article 2 of the EEC Treaty reads:
The Community shall have as its task, by establishing a common market and
progressively approximating the economic policies of Member States, to
promote throughout the Community a harmonious development of economic activities, a continuous and balanced expansion, an increase in stability, an accelerated raising of the standard of living and closer relations between the States belonging to it.
Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, Mar. 25, 1957, art. 2, 1973
Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 1 (Cmd. 5179-I), at 3 (official English trans.), 298 U.N.T.S. 11, 15
(1958) (unofficial English trans.) [hereinafter EEC Treaty].
2. See EEC Treaty, supra note 1, arts. 30-37, 1973 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 1, at 13-16,
298 U.N.T.S. at 26-30 (goods); arts. 52-58, 1973 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 1, at 23-25, 298
U.N.T.S. at 37-40 (persons); arts. 59-66, 1973 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 1, at 25-27, 298
U.N.T.S. at 40-42 (services); arts. 67-73, Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 1, at 27-29, 298 U.N.T.S.
at 42-44 (capital).
3. See Completing the Internal Market: White Paperfrom the Commission to the European
Council, COM(85) 310 final (June 14, 1985). Following the approval by the European
Council of the proposals contained in the White Paper, the Single European Act was
signed by Member States on February 17 and February 28, 1986. See Single European
Act, O.J. L 169/1, at 29 (1987).
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Treaty that ensure its establishment4 with those on which the
approximation of economic policies is based.5 In most cases
the market-establishment provisions include deadlines by
which they must be implemented and impose directly applicable obligations, which the nationals of Member States can invoke before their national judges, on Member States and their
undertakings. By contrast, the economic-approximation provisions are less precise and detailed, and, in general, confer less
6
extensive power on Community institutions.
The abolition of economic barriers offers undertakings the
possibility of operating in a larger market. This possibility
both increases the degree of competition and enables more efficient undertakings to heighten their competitiveness. The
most recent report of the Commission of the European Communities states:
A barrier-free internal market is an essential basis for increased prosperity in the Community as a whole. Only
when the various kinds of barriers which currently limit
their operations are removed will firms be able to take full
advantage of the Community's size and to deploy their
human, material and financial resources more efficiently.
The resulting improvement in industrial efficiency and competitiveness and in overall economic performance should
also make it possible to develop new ways of tackling the
problem of unemployment.7
The importance of the elimination of remaining barriersand its corollary, an increased degree of undistorted competition-to the internal market, should not obscure the fact that
4. EEC Treaty, supra note 1, arts. 12-17, 1973 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 1, at 7-9, 298
U.N.T.S. at 19-22 (elimination of customs duties among Member States).
5. EEC Treaty, supra note 1, arts. 100-102, 1973 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 1, at 37-38,
298 U.N.T.S. at 54-55 (approximation of laws); art. 105, 1973 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 1, at
39, 298 U.N.T.S. at 55-56 (coordination of economic policies).
6. For example, the Treaty established a Monetary Committee, with advisory
powers only, to promote coordination of the policies of Member States in the monetary field. EEC Treaty, supra note 1, art. 105, 1973 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 1, at 39, 298
U.N.T.S. at 55-56. Provisions concerning the common policies-agriculture, transport, and foreign commerce-constitute an exception in this regard. See P.J.G.
KAPTEYN

&

P. VERLOREN VAN THEMAAT, INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF THE EUROPEAN

COMMUNITIES 46-65 (1973); Bleckmann, Subventionsprobleme des GATT und der EG, 48
RABELS ZEITSCHRIFT FOR AUSLANDISCHES UND INTERNATIONALES PRIVATRECHT 419, 427

et seq. (1984).
7. COMM'N,

SIXTEENTH REPORT ON COMPETITION POLICY

introduction (1987).

1988]

GOVERNMENT EQUITY PARTICIPATION

313

the Community is also committed to a system of international
free trade, albeit to a lesser extent and under less stringent
procedures. The preamble of the EEC Treaty, while recognizing "that the removal of existing obstacles calls for concerted
action in order to guarantee . . .fair competition," 8 also ex-

presses the desire of the contracting parties to contribute "by
means of a common commercial policy to the progressive abolition of restrictions on international trade." 9 This principle is
confirmed by Article 110, according to which the establishment of a customs union among Member States aims to contribute, once again, to "the progressive abolition of restrictions on international trade."'
The economic and social benefits that can be expected at
both the internal and international levels from a system of free
trade are permanently at risk of being impaired by several obstacles, both political and commercial in nature. As experience
shows, the challenge inherent in every liberalization of trade
invariably stimulates latent protectionist forces. Well aware of
this danger, the authors of the Treaty included provisions that
the Commission, under the control of the Court, has authority
to enforce." These provisions not only expressly obligate
Member States to remove existing barriers, but also prevent
them from adopting new measures that would nullify the effect
of such removal.' 2 Particularly significant in this respect are
the rules of competition, especially those concerning aids
granted by Member States to undertakings,' 3 on which this
analysis will focus.
As the Commission recently stated:
[c]ompetition policy has a key role to play in ensuring that
8. EEC Treaty, supra note 1, preamble, 1973 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 1, at 1, 298
U.N.T.S. at 14.
9. Id. preamble, 1973 Gr.Brit. T.S. No. 1, at 1, 298 U.N.T.S. at 14.
10. Id. art. 110, 1973 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 1, at 41, 298 U.N.T.S. at 58; Bleckmann,
supra note 6, at 423.
11. See EEC Treaty, supra note 1, arts. 30-37, 1973 Gr.Brit. T.S. No. 1,at 13-16,
298 U.N.T.S. at 26-30 (goods); id. arts. 52-58, 1973 Gr.Brit. T.S. No. 1, at 23-25, 298
U.N.T.S. at 37-40 (persons); id. arts. 59-66, 1973 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 1, at 25-27, 298
U.N.T.S. at 40-42 (services); id. arts. 67-73, Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 1, at 27-29, 298
U.N.T.S. at 42-44 (capital).
-12. See id. art. 31, para. 1, 1973 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 1, at 13, 298 U.N.T.S. at 27;
id. art. 53, 1973 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 1, at 23, 298 U.N.T.S. at 38.
13. Id. arts. 92-94, 1973 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 1, at 35-36, 298 U.N.T.S. at 51-52.
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the opening of the market yields all the benefits expected of
it. It must ensure that these barriers are not replaced by
divisions of markets resulting from restrictive business practices or protectionist measures taken by the Member States.
The control of State aid is of particular importance in this
context. Member States may use aid to give their industry
an advantage over industry elsewhere in the Community.
Public funds may also be used to prop up uncompetitive
businesses and industries. This generally only renders ultimately more difficult the task of finding a genuine solution
and in the meantime tends to cause difficulties for more
competitive firms that are providing real jobs. Hence it is
essential to ensure that government funds are not used to
confer a competitive advantage on some firms at the expense of others.' 4
Article 92(1) declares incompatible with the common market
"any aid granted by a Member State or through State
resources in any form whatsoever which distorts or threatens to
distort competition by favouring certain undertakings or the
production of certain goods . . . in so far as it affects trade
among Member States."' 5 The EEC Treaty thus opposes in
principle any form of State intervention that can distort competition and restrict trade among Member States. Even the
limited de minimis rule, which is accepted in the field of restrictive practices of undertakings,1 6 is excluded when the State is
17
responsible.
An absolute prohibition of State aids would, however, be
inconceivable, especially in a system of mixed economy. State
aid is, after all, widely accepted, albeit with varying degrees, in
all EEC member countries, where the public and private sectors often jointly pursue the realization of major economic
goals. The EEC Treaty, drafted in a period of expansion,
14. COMM'N, SIXTEENTH REPORT ON COMPETITION POLICY 13-14 (1986).
15. EEC Treaty, supra note 1, art. 92(1), 1973 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 1, at 35, 298
U.N.T.S. at 51.

16. "[O]n agreements of minor importance which do not. fall under Article 85(1)
of the Treaty establishing the European Economic Community," see Comm'n Notice, O.J. C 231/2 (Sept. 3, 1986), Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 2700.
17. Government of the French Republic v. Commission, Case 47/69, 1970
E.C.R. 487, 495,
16-17, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8104, at 7158. The Commission has, however, simplified the procedure of notification for aids projects below
a certain threshold. See COMM'N, FOURTEENTH REPORT ON COMPETITION POLICY 199
(1984).
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when State aids were definitely of lesser practical importance
than they are today, nevertheless recognized the fact that such
aids can serve a variety of purposes, and more specifically, the
fact that certain socioeconomic objectives cannot be achieved
by market forces alone. 18 According to an official view, State
aids
may act as a stimulus for investments in certain enterprises,
industries or regions, or as an incentive for R&D projects,
for energy-saving measures or for the reduction of environmental pollution. Or else the aim may be to support sectors
or enterprises which would not be viable without financial
assistance from the State. Social objectives may be directly
striven after via aids for housing construction or for the9
training and employment of certain categories of people.'
Several exceptions have thus been expressly admitted by Article 92(3),2o whose pragmatic application has enabled the Commission progressively to work out a set of rules, in particular
for regional 2 ' and sectoral2 2 aids. These rules have made it
possible for the Commission to reconcile the pursuit, at a national level, of important social and economic objectives, with
the maintenance, at the Community level, of the degree of
competition necessary to make sure that the achievement of a
unified market is not impeded.
On the other hand, where State aids clash with fundamental objectives of the Community, such as the single-market
goal, the Commission has steadfastly refused to grant an exemption. 2 1 This refusal to exempt applies in particular to aids
that support exports to other countries. Another criterion on
18. See infra notes 19-22 and accompanying text.
19. M. Caspari, The Aid Rules of the EEC Treaty and Their Application, Colloquium on Discretionary Powers of the Member States in the Field of Economic Policies and Their Limits Under the EEC Treaty 1 (May 14-15, 1987) (mimeogr. text).
20. These include, in particular, "aid to facilitate the development of certain
economic activities or of certain economic areas, where such aid does not adversely
affect trading conditions to an extent contrary to the common interest." EEC Treaty,
supra note 1, art. 92(3)(c), 1973 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 1, at 35, 298 U.N.T.S. at 51.
21. See Communication of the Commission on Regional Aid Systems, O.J. C
31/9 (1979).
22. See Communication to the Council of Ministers of the EC on Commission Policy on
Sectoral Aid Schemes, COM(78) 221 final (May 1978), reprinted in COMM'N, COMPETITION
RULES IN THE EEC AND THE ECSC APPLICABLE TO STATE AIDS 37 et seq. (1987).
23. See COMM'N, FOURTEENTH REPORT ON COMPETITION POLICY
Decision of June 27, 1984, O.J. L 230/25 (1984).

(1985); see also Comm'n

166-167
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which the Commission relies when deciding whether the State
aids are compatible with the common market is whether they
contribute to the economic development of the region or sector
in question. 24 This condition is met, and the aid is permitted
if, for example, the supporting measures serve to spur the realization of a new project that is capable of generating new jobs,
or else where a viable undertaking facing transitional difficulties is able to restructure and recover its competitiveness by
means of the aid. However, aids of a conservatory nature, that is,
those that facilitate only the functioning of undertakings, or
that contribute to maintaining inefficient undertakings, are basically prohibited. 25 The application of this principle has led
the Commission to prohibit a number of state measures
granted to ailing firms that would have been obligated to cease
their activities but for that support.2 6 One such form of aid is
the infusion of fresh funds into the company through Government acquisition of equity. Government equity participation
has recently been the object of several decisions of the Commission, 272 as well as of rulings of the Court.2 8
B.

The GA TT Subsidies Code

While the evaluation of such interventions as aids in the
sense of Article 92 has given rise to a controversial debate
from the viewpoint of the internalmarket, a similar problem has
appeared on the external front, that is, in the commercial rela24. See Comm'n Decisions O.J. L 59/21, 22 (1984); O.J. L 276/34, 35 (1984);
O.J. L 62/18, 20 (1983); OJ. L 91/32, 33 (1983); O.J. L 280/30, 31 (1982) (Intermills); O.J. L 277/15, 16 (1982) (Leeuwarder Papierwarenfabriek); OJ. L 138/18, 19
(1982).
25. See OJ. L 59/21, 22 (1984); OJ. L 276/34, 35 (1984); O.J. L 62/18, 20
(1983); O.J. L 91/32, 33 (1983); O.J. L 280/30, 31 (1982) (Intermills); OJ. L 277/15,
16 (1982) (Leeuwarder Papierwarenfabriek);O.J. L 138/18, 19 (1982).
26. See OJ. L 59/21, 22 (1984); OJ. L 276/34, 35 (1984); OJ. L 62/18, 20
(1983); OJ. L 91/32, 33 (1983); O.J. L 280/30, 31 (1982) (Intermills); OJ. L 277/15,
16 (1982) (LeeuwarderPapierwarenfabriek);O.J. L 138/18, 19 (1982).
27. See O.J. L 59/21 (1984); OJ. L 276/34 (1984); OJ. L 62/18 (1983); OJ. L
91/32 (1983); O.J. L 280/30 (1982) (Intermills); OJ. L 277/15 (1982) (Leeuwarder
Papierwarenfabriek);OJ. L 138/18 (1982).
28. See Belgium v. Commission, Case 40/85, 1986 E.C.R. -, Common Mkt.
Rep. (CCH)
14,375; Belgium v. Commission, Case 234/84, 1986 E.C.R. -, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH)
14,374; Kingdom of the Netherlands and Leeuwarder
Papierwarenfabriek BV v. Commission, Joined Cases 296 and 318/82, 1985 E.C.R.
809, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH)
14,170; Intermills v. Commission, Case 323/82,
1984 E.C.R. 3809, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH)
14,154.

1988]

GOVERNMENT EQUITY PARTICIPATION

tions between the Community and the United States, in the
framework of the GATT. The original text of the GATT contained provisions on export subsidies. 29 However, the signatories, in particular the United States and most EC Member
States, also considered it necessary to achieve some control
over other forms of subsidies that, although not directly related to exports, could have damaging effects on international
trade (the so-called "domestic subsidies"). After long and difficult negotiation, the signatories adopted the so-called Subsidies Code, 0 the essential points of which can be summarized
as follows. First, the Code accepts the general principle that,
although subsidies promote important social and economic
policy objectives, they may cause "adverse effects to the interests of other signatories."' 3 1 Signatories shall therefore "seek
to avoid causing, through the use of any subsidy," injury or
prejudice to the interests of other signatories. 2 Second, the
Code distinguishes between export subsidies, which
"[s]ignatories shall not grant, ' 33 and "domestic subsidies," for
which a complex rule has been adopted. This rule has given
rise to serious difficulties in the interpretation and in the application of the Code. 34 Third, the Code sets forth two proce29. See General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, art. XVI, 61
Stat. (pt. 5) A3, A51-A52, T.I.A.S. No. 1700, at 47-48, 55 U.N.T.S. 188, 250.
30. Agreement on Interpretation and Application of Articles VI, XVI, and XXIII
of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade [hereinafter Subsidies Code], BASIC
INSTRUMENTS AND SELECTED DOCUMENTS 56-83 (26th Supp. 1980) [hereinafter BISD].

For a description of the negotiations that led to the adoption of the Code, see J.
BARTON & B. FISHER, INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND INVESTMENT 351 (1986). Some
passages of the present article concerning the Subsidies Code are based on a contribution to volume 7 of the Italian Yearbook of InternationalLaw (1986) (forthcoming),

where I have examined the subject in greater detail.
31. Subsidies Code, supra note 30, art. 8(1), BISD, supra note 30, at 67.
32. Id. art. 8(3), BISD, supra note 30, at 67 (emphasis added).
33. Id. art. 9(1), BISD, supra note 30, at 68.
34. Article 11(1) of the Subsidies Code first recognizes that domestic subsidies
"are widely used as important instruments for the promotion of social and economic
policy objectives" and that "the right of signatories to use such subsidies to achieve
these and other important policy objectives" is not restricted. It then enumerates
examples of such objectives, among which "to facilitate the restructuring, under socially acceptable conditions, of certain sectors." BISD, supra note 19, at 69-70. Article 11(3) indicates several examples of domestic subsidies, which include "government
subscription to, or provision of, equity capital." Id.at 70. On the other hand, Article
11(2) warns that domestic subsidies "may cause or threaten to cause injury to a domestic industry of another signatory or serious prejudice to the interests of another
signatory ....

in particular where such subsidies would adversely affect the condi-
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dures whereby a signatory can adopt defensive measures.
First, the Code foresees the adoption of countervailing duties
by a signatory's competent nationalauthority following an investigation by that authority to determine the existence of a subsidy,
of an injury, and of a causal link between them.3 5 This procedure is the so-called "Track I." Another, less stringent procedure, "Track II," is foreseen in the second part of the Code: if
the signatories involved have not arrived at a mutually acceptable solution after consultation, any of the signatories involved
may refer the matter to a Committee for conciliation established
within the GATT, which may authorize "such countermea' 36
sures as may be appropriate.
The Code contains several ambiguities, which have caused
serious tensions, especially in the trade relations between the
United States and the EEC.3 7 First, it is not clear whether the
emphasis is on the positive or the negative effects of domestic
subsidies.3 The ambiguity is even greater in the field of remedies: does the acknowledgement by Article 1(1) of the signatories' "right" to use domestic subsidies restrict the scope of
the Track I remedy, the unilateral imposition of countervailing
duties by the authority of the importing signatory? The affirmative answer would mean that Track II remedies would be
available. The applicability, according to Article 11(2), of the
tions of normal competition." Id. at 70. As under Article 8(3), signatories are requested to "seek to avoid" causing such harmful effects and, "when drawing up their

policies and practices in this field," also to weigh "as far as practicable, ...
adverse effects on trade." Id. at 70.

possible

35. See Subsidies Code, supra note 30, art. 2(1), BISD, supra note 30, at 57-58.
36. See id. art. 13(4), BISD, supra note 19, at 72.
37. Benyon & Bourgeois, The European Community-United States Steel Arrangement,
21 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 305 (1984); Dominick, CountervailingState Aids to Steel: A
Casefor InternationalConsensus, 21 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 355 (1984).
38. As several authors have pointed out, the Code does not say how the balance
should be struck. See, e.g., Benyon & Bourgeois, supra note 37, at 324. As another
author has noted,
It is not surprising that no agreement has been reached on how to deal with
domestic subsidies. For, as Article 11of the Subsidies Code recognizes, domestic subsidies are an integral part of each country's social and economic
fabric. International agreement on their use and application, therefore,
would require a degree of consensus on an array of economic and social
issues that is presently unattainable and which may not be attainable in the
near future.
Marcuss, UnderstandingDirect and Indirect Subsidies: Are The Problems Negotiable or Incurable?, in INTERNATIONAL LAW INST., INTERFACE THREE: LEGAL TREATMENT OF DOMESTIC SUBSIDIES 51, 54 (1984).
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."injury" test 3 9 seems, however, to suggest that domestic subsidies are countervailable. This argument is the view accepted
by the United States, which expressly included domestic aids in
its Trade Agreements Act, enacted in 1979 to implement the
Code.40
A comparison of the EEC and the GATT sets of rules
reveals a number of important differences. On the one hand, it
follows from the single-market goal-a central feature of the
EEC-that State aids that distort competition and trade among
Member States are incompatible with the Common Market
and, with certain exceptions, prohibited. On the other hand,
the less stringent rules in the Subsidies Code correspond to
the intergovernmental, cooperative nature of the GATT. The
sanctions also differ: if a State does not comply with a Commission decision ordering the abolition or modification of an
aid, the only possible sanction is an appeal by the Commission
to the Court.4 1 Unilateral measures by other Member States
(such as granting other aids to compensate for those that have
been prohibited, or imposing countervailing duties on products originating from the subventioning State) are, as a rule,
inconceivable.4 2 By contrast, measures of this type, whether
unilaterally or multilaterally decided, are precisely the means
to which a signatory can resort within GATT.4 3
Still, these differences must not conceal the existence of
some important analogies. The basic objective of both systems
is to prevent a State from adopting certain measures, however
important from the national viewpoint, without taking into account their possible negative effects on other States.
The EEC and the United States, its major commercial
39. See supra note 34.

40. See Trade Agreements Act of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-39, § 101, 93 Stat. 144,
150-89 (1979) (codified as amended at 19 U.S.C.A. §§ 1671-16 7 7g (West 1980 &
Supp. 1987)). The Act contains an illustrative list of domestic subsidies that can be
countervailed if they are found to affect U.S. industry. Among others, the Act mentions "[t]he provision of capital, loans, or loan guarantees on terms inconsistent with
commercial considerations," 19 U.S.C. § 1677(5)(B)(i)(1982), and "[t]he grant of
funds or forgiveness of debt to cover operating losses sustained by a specific industry," id. § 1677(5)(B)(iii) (1982).
41. See EEC Treaty, supra note 1, art. 169, 1973 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 1, at 56-57,
298 U.N.T.S. at 75.
42. But see id. art. 46, 1973 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 1, at 21, 298 U.N.T.S. at 75 (special
provisions for agriculture).
43. See supra notes 35-36 and accompanying text (Tracks I and II procedures).
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partner, thus arrive at a similar result: both in intra-Community trade and in their commercial relations with the GATT,
any aid or subsidy that has a restrictive or distorting effect on
normal commercial relations is prohibited, or at least subject
to some control. Although both systems of law take a more
stringent position vis-a-vis express export aid, they share a serious concern that other types of aids can produce damaging
effects.
II.

GOVERNMENT EQUITY PARTICIPATION AND THE
EEC TREA TY. THE COMMISSION'S RESPONSE

Government equity participation in commercial companies is a common form of State intervention in most Member
States of the EEC. The association of public and private capital within the same undertaking may serve a variety of purposes. For one, the State may wish to obtain decisive influence
over the conduct of an undertaking so as to orient its major
decisions, especially those relating to investments, in a direction that conforms with the goals of the State's general economic policy. For another, the State, like a merchant bank,
may wish to buy and then eventually to sell for profit the equity
that it has bought in a promising company.
The acquisition by the Government of equity participation
is as such not prohibited by the EEC Treaty; according to Article 222, the Treaty "shall in no way prejudice the rules in
Member States governing the system of property ownership."' 44 This provision, which the Commission has always interpreted very broadly, has formed, for example, the basis for
reconciling with the Treaty certain nationalizations that have
been effected in some Member States.4 5 However, problems in
interpreting Article 222 arise when public equity participation
is used to support economically dubious or ailing initiatives.
Here the state comes close to the borderline between what the
Treaty allows under Article 222 and what it prohibits under
Article 92.
At what point government equity injections infringe Arti44. See EEC Treaty, supra note 1, art. 222, 1973 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 1, at 70, 298
U.N.T.S. at 88.
45. See, e.g., Answers to Written Questions Concerning the Nationalizations Decided by the French Government in 1981, OJ. C 65/3-6 (Mar. 15, 1982).
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cle 92 is the question that the Commission has had to resolve
in a series of recent cases.4 6 Since 1972 the Commission has
set forth several criteria by which it can distinguish a government participation compatible with Treaty obligations from
other forms of aid proscribed by Article 92.17 The Commission's first opportunity to do so came when it examined an Italian law enacted to "encourage the restructuring and the conversion of certain industrial undertakings. "48 In addition to
granting "classic" aids (for example, preferential credit terms),
the law provided for the acquisition of temporary holdings
through public financial institutions. In considering that the
principle of neutrality set out by Article 222 prohibited Member States from implementing measures that, if other intervention techniques were used, would infringe Article 92, the Commission held that the equity participation element of the Italian
law could not stand. 49 The decision required the Commission
to draw the line between the use of equity participation
schemes within Article 222 and those that are incompatible
with the common market. In the Commission's opinion, there
are certain forms of public investment schemes in which the
State is acting as an investor of venture capital. These schemes
include the setting up of new firms by the State as well as the
purchase of holdings either in existing firms, or in those set up
in association with private capital. Even where the objective of
these investments went beyond that of making a profit, Article
222 could still apply. Article 222 was inapplicable, however,
where the State, working through public investment organizations, purchased equity in a firm to see it through a period of
economic difficulty. 50
The Commission had to go further and develop criteria to
allow it to identify ex ante a government equity participation as
an aid falling under Article 92(1). In the Italian subsidies case
the clues listed were: (i) that the equity participation is used as
an alternative to or in conjunction with classic aids; (ii) that the
46. See 0.J. L 59/21 (1984); 0J. L 276/34 (1984); 0J. L 62/18 (1983); OJ. L
91/32 (1983); 0.J. L 280/30 (1982) (Intermills); 0J. L 277/15, (1982) (Leeuwarder
Papierwarenfabriek); 0J.L 138/18 (1982).
47. See infra notes 48-51, 63-67 and accompanying text.

48.

COMM'N, SECOND REPORT ON COMPETITION POLICY

49. Id. 124.
50. Id.

122 (1973).
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firms in question would disappear from the market but for that
intervention; or (iii) that the investment does not generate a
normal return, or that the holding is eventually sold to the firm
5
at a loss. '
The Commission's reference to the hypothetical behavior
of private investors raises a number of new questions, however. How can one predict the choice that a private investor
would make, there being no clear concept of how he would
react to an investment opportunity? It is impossible to say for
certain that a natural or legal person would not invest in a company that might, with the necessary capital, be turned around
and brought back to profitability. Second, where the State has
already invested considerable sums in a firm in difficulty, the
State can possibly avoid further losses only by injecting fresh
capital. Faced with this situation, would the private investor
pull out and lose his investment, or would he agree to
purchase further equity in the hope of recovering some of his
capital?
The investigation of several cases of presumed infringement of Article 92, in particular during the period 1982 to
1984, gave the Commission the opportunity to work out more
precise criteria for the evaluation of the aid effect of equity participations. The results of this participation are contained in
several decisions,52 as well as in a notice53 that summarizes the
Commission's main line of thought and that constitutes a sort
of code of equity participations. On the other hand, following
appeals of some of those decisions, the Court has had the opportunity to clarify several aspects of the dispute."
The cases investigated by the Commission had two points
in common. First, all the firms in which the Member States in
51. Id.
52. See O.J. L 59/21 (1984); O.J. L 276/34 (1984); O.J. L 62/18 (1983); O.J. L

91/32 (1983); O.J. L 280/30 (1982) (Intermills); O.J. L 277/15 (1982) (Leeuwarder
Papierwarenfabriek);O.J. L 138/18 (1982).

53. Public Authorities' Holdings in Company Capital, 1984 E.C. BULL. No. 9, at 93
(1984) [hereinafter Public Authorities' Holdings].

54. See Belgium v. Commission, Case 40/85, 1986 E.C.R. -,
Common Mkt.
Rep. (CCH) 14,375; Belgium v. Commission, Case 234/84, 1986 E.C.R. -, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH)
14,374; Kingdom of the Netherlands and Leeuwarder
Papierwarenfabriek BV v Commission, Joined Cases 296 and 318/82, 1985 E.C.R.
809, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH)
14,170; Intermills v. Commission, Case 323/82,
1984 E.C.R. 3809, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH)
14,154.
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question had invested were or had been in a difficult financial
They had suffered continuous losses for several
situation.
years, and some of them had gone into bankruptcy. Second,
the industrial sectors in which they operated were suffering
from overcapacity, rendering the State subsidies inopportune
if not damaging to the whole sector.5" The Commission therefore found that the equity participations were incompatible
with the common market and should therefore be suppressed.5 1 In certain cases, the Commission held that the participation was a rescuing aid,58 while in others, it considered it
unlikely that the undertaking would have been able to raise the
funds needed for its survival on the private capital market. 59
The Commission thus again referred to the criterion of the
presumed behavior of a private investor in similar circumstances. In the present cases, however, the Commission had at
its disposal figures proving that the firms had almost invariably
incurred serious losses.60
The importance of the principles in question, as well as
the fact that this form of state intervention has clearly taken on
increased importance, have induced the Commission to analyze systematically its various aspects. The result is a document, 6 1 sent to all Member States, which expresses the Comission's views as to when a state equity acquisitition constitutes
an aid, as opposed to a "normal" investment. The Commis55. See Oj. L 59/21, at 22 (1984); OJ. L 276/34, at 35 (1984); O.J. L 62/18, at
19 (1983); O.J. L 91/32, at 33 (1983); O.J. L 280/30, at 30 (1982) (Intermills); OJ. L
277/15, at 15 (1982) (LeeuwarderPapierwarenfabriek);O.J. L 138/18, at 18 (1982).
56. See O.J. L 59/2 1, at 22 (1984); Oj. L 276/34, at 35 (1984); O.J. L 62/18, at
21 (1983); O.J. L 91/32, at 32 (1983); O.J. L 280/30, at 30 (1982) (Intermills); O.J. L
277/15, at 15 (1982) (Leeuwarder Papierwarenfabriek);O.J. L 138/18, at 19 (1982).
57. See O.J. L 59/21 at 22 (1984); O.J. L 276/34 at 35 (1984); O.J. L 62/18 at 20
(1983); O.J. L 91/32 at 33 (1983); O.J. L 280/30 at 31 (1982) (Intermills); O.J. L
277/15 at 16 (1982) (Leeuwarder Papierwarenfabriek);O.J. L 138/18 at 19 (1982).
58. See O.J. L 62/18 at 19 (1983); O.J. L 280/30 at 30 (1982) (Intermills); O.J. L
138/18 at 18 (1982).
59. This view is expressed in almost all the relevant Commission decisions. See,
e.g., O.J. L 276/34 at 35 ("the company's financial situation was a handicap which
makes it very unlikely that it could have raised the finance it needed to survive on the
private capital market"); see also O.J. L 277/15 at 15; O.J. L 280/30 at 30; 0. J. L
91/32 at 32; O.J. L 59/21 at 22.
60. See Oj. L 59/21 at 22 (1984); OJ. L 276/34 at 35 (1984); OJ. L 62/18 at 19
(1983); O.J. L 91/32 at 33 (1983); O.J. L 280/30 at 30 (1982) (Intermills); O.J. L
277/15 at 15 (1982) (Leeuwarder Papierwarenfabriek);O.J. L 138/18 at 18 (1982).
61. Public Authorities' Holdings, supra note 53, at 93.
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sion also restated the procedural rules that Member States
62
must observe concerning notification of new aids.
The basic idea in the document is that there is State aid
"where fresh capital is contributed in circumstances that would
not be acceptable to a private investor operating under normal
market economy conditions." 6 The comparison with the presumed behavior of the private investor is thus once again a criterion. The Commission does not establish general conditions
for the application of this principle; it indicates instead a
number of practically relevant cases where it can be assumed
to apply. 6 4 Two of these cases appear to be particularly important: (i) where the financial situation of the undertaking is such
that it is impossible to predict whether or not the invested capital will produce a normal return within a reasonable period of
time; and (ii) where, because of insufficient cash flow, the undertaking is unable to raise the funds it needs for its investment program on the capital market.6 5 In these cases, Article
92(1) is, as a rule, deemed to be applicable. The Commission
does admit that it is not always possible to be certain a priori as
to its applicability, and that the only solution left is an ex post
examination.6 6 However, the document lists two situations
where the character of aid may be presumed: (i) where the equity participation follows the granting of "classic" aids; and
(ii) where the firm operates in a sector suffering from overcapacity.6 7
We can conclude that the principal common denominator
in the Commission's various arguments is the finding that the
undertaking is in a bad financial situation. This situation
makes a private financing unlikely and confers on the government equity participation the character of an aid, as opposed
to a provision of risk capital, according to normal market economy conditions.
III.

THE COURT OFJUSTICE RULINGS

The first case concerning State aids appealed to the Court
62. Id. at 94, point 4.
63. Id. at 94, point 3.3.

64. Id. at 94, point 3.3, (i)-(vi).
65. Id. at 94, point 3.3, (i)-(ii).
66. Id.at 94, point 3.4.
67. Id.at 94, points 3.4., (i) and (iii).
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dealt with aids granted by the Belgian government to the paper manufacturer Intermills. 68 The aid had two components:
(i) a low-interest loan as well as two repayable advances; and
(ii) the acquisition of a holding by the Walloon Regional Executive. 69 The government had allocated the loan and advances
in 1980 to support a restructuring program that included closing three of five manufacturing plants and switching the remaining operation from bulk- to specialized-paper production.
The Commission had concluded that this part of the aid satisfied Article 92(3)(c) and was therefore compatible with the
common market. 70 However, the Commission found that the
government's acquisition of equity bore no relation to the restructuring measures and that, in view of the firm's financial
difficulties, it should be treated as a " 'rescue aid,' intended ' to
7
allow the undertaking to meet its financial commitments. 1
This aid was declared incompatible with Article 92 and prohib72

ited.

On appeal, the Court annulled the decision for reasons
not connected with the central question of the evaluation of
the equity participation. For one, the Court held that the
Commission had not clearly shown why the equity participation was unrelated to the restructuring plan.73 For another, it
found that the Commission had not sufficiently taken into account the effects of the reorientation of the firm's production:
in this case, "the Commission has not shown why the applicant's activities on the market, following the conversion of its
production with the assistance of the aid granted, were likely to
have such an adverse effect on trading conditions that the undertaking's disappearance would have been preferable to its
rescue." 7 4 The Court thus seemed to suggest that the existence of a restructuring plan that satisfies Article 92(3) can constitute a valid justification even though the undertaking would
disappear from the market without that aid. But the Court
68. S.A. Intermills v. Commission, Case 323/82, 1984 E.C.R. 3809, Common
Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 14,154.
69. Id. at 3813, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 14,154, at 15,878.
70. Id., Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 14,154, at 15,878-79.
71. Id. at 3824, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 14,154, at 15,885.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 3831, 35, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 14,154, at 15,889.
74. Id. at 3832, 39, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 14,154, at 15,889.
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hardly mentioned the question whether equity participation
should be considered an aid. It merely confirmed that the
Treaty considers that State aids can be granted "in any manner
whatsoever" 7 5 and that equity participation can constitute an
illicit aid. 76 It thus left open the question of the circumstances
under which Article 92(1) would be applicable to such a participation.
The Leeuwarder Papierwarenfabriek case, 7 decided by the
Court a few months after Intermills, is an important point in the
development of the Court's doctrine. In Leeuwarder, the Commission had found that the equity holding of the Dutch government in a paperboard-processing firm was incompatible
with the Treaty. 78 According to the Commission, "[t]he financial structure of the firm, which urgently needed to carry out
replacement investments, and the overcapacity in the paperboard-processing industry, constituted handicaps indicating
that the firm would probably have been unable to raise on the
private capital markets the funds essential to its survival." ' 79 So
far, Leeuwarder was similar to Intermills; its novelty, however, lay
in the fact that the question of the evaluation of the equity participation from the viewpoint of Article 92 was raised before
the Court. The applicants contested the applicability of the
provision, arguing that the Commission had not shown that
their undertaking was in difficulty. The Leeuwarder Court rejected this argument:
In this case it was the absence of the possibility of raising
finance on the private capital market which indicated that
the contribution in question amounted to aid in the light of
three factors, namely the financial structure of the undertaking, its urgent need for replacement investments and the
over-capacity in the paperboard-processing sector. In the
Commission's opinion those factors made it unlikely that
75. EEC Treaty, supra note 1, art. 92(1), 1973 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 1, at 35, 298
U.N.T.S. at 51.
76. See Intermills, 1984 E.C.R. at 3830,
30-32, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH)
14,154, at 15,888.
77. Kingdom of the Netherlands and Leeuwarder Papierwarenfabriek BV v.
Commission, Joined Cases 296 and 318/82, 1985 E.C.R. 809, Common Mkt. Rep.
(CCH) 14,170.
78. Commission Decision, OJ. L 277/15, at 17 (1982).
79. Id. at 15.
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the undertaking would be able to raise on the private capital
markets the funds essential to its survival ....
That statement of reasons satisfies the requirements of
Article 190 of the EEC Treaty since it is sufficient to permit
a review by the Court and gives those concerned an appropriate opportunity to express their views on the accuracy
80
and relevance of the alleged facts and circumstances.
Although it does not answer the crucial question of the evaluation of the equity participation, the judgment is important because the Court considered the criteria utilized by the Commission to establish the character of an equity participation,
and for the first time indicated its support for the Commission's comparison with the behavior of a private investor in
normal market economy conditions.
This line of thought has been developed in two further
judgments affirming Commission decisions qualifying substantial equity participation by the Belgian government in two
firms as illicit aids. 8 ' Both firms had suffered serious financial
losses for several years. Initially, the Government had resorted
to using classic aids and had later supplemented these aids
with a substantial equity participation. Despite restructuring
measures, the firms eventually went bankrupt.8 2
The Belgian government argued both before the Commission and the Court that preventing a state from supporting domestic enterprises facing transitional difficulties effectively discriminated between public and private financial groups, particularly when, as in this case, the contribution to equity was part
of a restructuring plan that foresaw reorientation of the firm's
activity." The central question was thus clearly put to the
Court: can the public shareholder be prohibited from using his
financial means for supporting an undertaking without in so
doing discriminating against the private shareholders, who, in a
80. Leeuwarder, 1985 E.C.R. at 824, T 20-21, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) T
14,170, at 16,041.
81. Belgium v. Commission, Case 234/84, 1986 E.C.R. -, Common Mkt. Rep.
(CCH) 14,374; Belgium v. Commission, Case 40/85, 1986 E.C.R. -, Common
Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 14,375, at 17,487.
82. See Belgium v. Commission, Case 234/84, 1986 E.C.R. at -, Common Mkt.
Rep. (CCH) 14,374, at 17,480.
83. See Belgium v. Commission, Case 234/84, 1986 E.C.R. -,
Common Mkt.
Rep (CCH) 14,374, at 17,480; Belgium v. Commission, Case 40/85, 1986 E.C.R. at
-, Common Mkt. Rep (CCH) 14,375, at 17,486.
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comparable situation, would carry out such an intervention?
And if so, under what circumstances? Would such a prohibition offend the principle, accepted by the Treaty, 8 4 of non-discrimination between the private and public sector of an economy? The Belgian argument was strengthened by the reference to the restructuring program, which, as we have seen, had
been taken into account by the Court in both Intermills and
Leeuwarder. The Court's answer, almost identical in both opinions, expressly upheld the validity of the Commission's analysis. 85 To decide whether an equity participation constitutes a
State aid, it is justified, the Court stated,
to apply the criterion, which was mentioned in the Commission's decision and, moreover, was not contested by the
Belgian Government, of determining to what extent the undertaking would be able to obtain the sums in question on
the private capital markets. In the case of an undertaking
whose capital is held by the public authorities, the test is, in
particular, whether in similar circumstances a private shareholder, having regard to the foreseeability of obtaining a return and leaving aside all social, regional-policy and
sectoral considerations,
would have subscribed the capital
86
in question.
The Court thus gives its support to the essence of the Commission's approach, which is the comparison of the public intervention in a given case and the presumed behavior of a private
investor in a similar case.8 In the two cases under examination the Court approved the conclusions the Commission drew
from that comparison. The fact that the firms had incurred serious losses for several years, as well as the fact that they operated in markets suffering from over-capacity, made it unlikely
that they would have been able to raise the funds needed for
84. See EEC Treaty, supra note 1, art. 90, 1973 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 1, at 34, 298
U.N.T.S. at 50.
85. Belgium v. Commission, Case 234/84, 1986 E.C.R. at -, Common Mkt.
Rep (CCH) 14,374, at 17,480; Belgium v. Commission, Case 40/85, 1986 E.C.R. at
-, Common Mkt. Rep (CCH)
14,375, at 17,486.
86. Belgium v. Commission, Case 234/84, 1986 E.C.R. at -, Common Mkt.
Rep (CCH) 14,374, at 17,481; see also Belgium v. Commission, Case 40/85, 1986
E.C.R. at-, Common Mkt. Rep (CCH) 14,375, at 17,486.
87. The Court seems to restrict the validity of the comparison to the case where
the capital of the company is owned by the public authorities. However, the reasoning should not be different if, as can occur in practice, the shareholders were private.
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their survival on the private capital markets. The contribution
to equity by public authorities could thus only be considered
aids in the sense of Article 92.88

Within the U.S. Trade Agreements Act, equity infusions
into a company constitute a countervailable subsidy if they are
provided on terms "inconsistent with commercial considerations."' s In interpreting this provision, the U.S. authorities,
especially the Department of Commerce, have arrived at results that present several analogies to the conclusions of the
Commission or the Court. It is accepted "that neither government equity ownership per se, nor any secondary benefit to the
company reflecting the private market's reaction to government ownership, confers a subsidy." 90 As in the case of the
EEC Treaty, one must identify the factors conferring on a measure that is in itself neutral the quality of a subsidy. Such an
investigation does not yield results substantially different from
those that have been accepted by the Commission and the
Court. The Department states: "An equity subsidy potentially
arises when the government makes equity infusions into a
company which is sustaining deep or significant continuing
losses and for which there does not, appear to be any reasonable indication of a rapid recovery."'" Thus, both the U.S. and
the Commission employ an essentially similar approach. Both
pose the same question: whether the undertaking that the government has invested in is creditworthy. And the criteria used
for answering the question are also basically the same, including, first, the financial performance of the undertaking. The
Department of Commerce states: "Before we consider government equity infusions as countervailable subsidies, we must
find the company under investigation not to be equityworthy.
Our equityworthy analysis involves assessing the company's
88. Belgium v. Commission, Case 234/84, 1986 E.C.R. at -, Comm. Mkt. Rep.
(CCH) 14,374, at 17,481; Belgium v. Commission, Case 40/85, 1986 E.C.R. at -,
Comm. Mkt. Rep (CCH) 14,375, at 17,487.

89. 19 U.S.C. § 1677(5)(B)(i) (1982).
90. Final Affirmative Countervailing Duty Determinations; Certain Steel Products from Belgium, 47 Fed. Reg. 39,304, 39,318-19 (Sept. 7, 1972). The evaluation
of government equity acquisition as countervailable subsidy has been thoroughly analyzed by the Department of Commerce, which has published a Methodology, that is,
a set of principles that it applies when dealing with the main forms of state assistance
to firms. Id. at 39,316-23.
91. Id. at 39,319.
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current and past financial health and gives great weight to a
company's recent rate of return on equity. '"92 The Department
of Commerce also accepts the comparison with the foreseeable
conduct of a private investor.93
CONCLUSION
Most European countries, especially those that are members of the EEC, frequently resort to various forms of direct
intervention in their economies. Such intervention raises a difficult question, however. While many of these interventions
are traditional instruments through which those countries effect their national economic policy, they can nevertheless conflict at both the EEC and GATT levels with the generally accepted principle of undistorted competition in international
trade.
Recent developments within the EEC and in the trade relations between the EEC and the United States show that this
dilemma arises, in particular, when a government acquires equity in a commercial company. To be sure, the fact that such
an operation is effected by the public authorities neither alters
its financial nature nor necessarily confers on it an anticompetitive character. Under certain circumstances, however, a different conclusion may be unescapable. The identification of
these circumstances is a delicate task, because the infusion of
fresh funds into a company by means of equity acquisition undoubtedly carries with it an element of "aid." Criteria distinguishing trade-distorting measures from mere financial investments are required both in the EEC, to delimitate the applicability of Article 92 to State aids, and in EEC-United States
trade relations, so as to determine whether certain "domestic"
subsidies are countervailable.
As the preceding analysis shows, both the EEC institutions
92. Industrial Nitrocellulose from France, Final Results of Countervailing Duties, 52 Fed. Reg. 833, 840 (Jan. 9, 1987).
93. The Department stated:
In making an equityworthy determination, we consider the company as a
whole, not specific areas of the company. This is the approach a reasonable
private investor would take. A reasonable investor would not invest in a
company that has earned a profit in one comparatively small product line...
if all other product lines lost money.
Id. at 840.
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and the United States authorities have arrived at basically the
same result after a distinct, complex process of litigation or negotiation. The decisive factor in distinguishing State investments is a consideration of the past and present financial and
economic situation of the company in which the government
has acquired equity. The healthier the company, the more
likely it is that government intervention constitutes a mere investment, similar to what any private investor would make.
However, as the company's losses get higher and as its period
of financial difficulties gets longer, it is more unlikely that the
company would have been able to obtain the funds it needed
on the private capital market. The conclusion that the government acquired equity in the company to rescue it from more
serious difficulties or even from bankruptcy follows naturally.
To be sure, this criterion is only a general one; further analysis
and refinements are needed to adapt it to a variety of situations
that may arise in practice. But its importance should not be
underestimated. If EEC countries apply the same discipline
that the EEC Treaty imposes on them to their relations with
the United States, further trade wars may be prevented.

